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Education
2019- October
2023 - September
PhD Philosophy (AHRC Funded)
Birkbeck, University of London
2018 - September
2019 - September
Masters (Arts and Humanities Bursary Funded)
Durham University
Distinction
2015 - September
2018 - June
BA (Hons) in Philosophy
Durham University
First Class Honours
Thesis title: Mary Midgley’s Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism
​Supervisor: Dr Sophia Connell (Birkbeck College, University of London)
Examiners: Professor Benjamin Lipscomb (Houghton University) & Dr Evgenia Mylonaki (University of Patras, Greece)
Viva date: 05.06.23
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My thesis makes the case for thinking that Mary Midgley is a Neo-Aristotelian Naturalist. I have two central aims. First, I defend a historical and philosophical case for Midgley’s inclusion into this contemporary branch of meta-ethics known as ‘Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism’ – a form of meta-ethical naturalism which seeks to found ethics on claims about human nature. Second, I argue that an appeal to Midgley’s naturalism can solve a central issue we find in other formulations of Neo-Aristotelianism. Broadly put, Midgleyan Neo-Aristotelianism collapses the conceptual distinction between human animals and nonhuman animals typically found within the history of ethics and inherited by many formulations of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism. Ultimately, the upshot of this thesis is that Mary Midgley is an important figure in the history of ethics, particularly in the context of discussions about meta-ethical naturalism.
Dissertation title: Delimiting the Moral Domain: A Midgleyan Case for Open Ethical Instincts
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Supervisor: Dr Clare Mac Cumhaill (Durham University)
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My dissertation provided a descriptively adequate account of the interrelated moral lives of humans and non-human animals via Mary Midgley’s hitherto unexamined concept of an ‘instinct’. In the shape of two central charges, I argue contemporary naturalisms of Philippa Foot and John McDowell overlook both the moral importance of nonhuman animal life and the roles and inter-dependencies of animal life within human life. I argue that we ought to liberalise naturalism in a Midgleyan sense by including an account of ‘instinct’ within our conception of the natural, henceforth delimiting the ethical domain to include nonhuman animals.